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clauses. Moreover, aware of this construction, parties to collective
bargaining contracts will better be able to frame the exact results
they want from arbitration.

ATTORNEYS' FEES FIRST DEPARTMENT CONTINGENT FEE
SCHEDULE-HELD VOID AS CONTRARY TO STATUTE. - Plaintiffattorneys sought a judgment declaring invalid Special Rule 4 1 of the
Appellate Division, First Department. The Rule purported to regu-

late the amounts of contingent fees which attorneys may charge in
personal injury and wrongful death actions.

The Appellate Division

affirmed the New York Supreme Court holding that, since the Appellate Division has no power to enact rules of civil practice contrary to
statute, 2 the Rule was void as being in opposition to Section 474 of

the Judiciary Law.3 Gair v. Peck, 139 N.Y.L.J. No. 64, p. 1, col. 1
(App. Div. 3d Dep't March 27, 1958) (per curiam), affirming

6 M.2d 739, 165 N.Y.S.2d 247 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
Contracts for attorneys' fees have always been subject to court
scrutiny.4 In New York, contingent fee agreements are valid pro-

vided they are reasonable according to the circumstances of the case.5
The New York Appellate Division has powers of inquiry into
the activities of attorneys. 6 They may discipline those guilty of unprofessional conduct 7 and regulate the admission of attoi-neys to
practice. 8
Through its general powers of inquiry the Appellate Division has
the power to discipline an attorney if he charges an unconscionable
fee. 9 The unconscionableness of the fee, however, is a matter of fact.
All the circumstances of the case must be considered, such as the
1 1ST DEP'T SPECIAL RULE 4.
2 N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 83.

3 Attorneys' fees are to be determined by contract between the parties.
Id. §474.
4 See, e.g., Nesbit v. Lockman, 34 N.Y. *167, 169-70 (1866).
5Fowler v. Callan, 102 N.Y. *395, 7 N.E. 169 (1886). See also CANONS
OF PROF. ETHICS, A. B. A. 13, which provides that a contingent fee agreement
is valid, provided it is reasonable according to the circumstances of the case.
The canons of professional ethics are entitled to the force of the law in New
York. Cf. Matter of Annunziato's Estate, 201 Misc. 971, 108 N.Y.S.2d 101
(Surr. Ct. 1951).
6 People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 162 N.E. 487 (1928).
7 N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 90(2). See also note 6 supra.
8 Id. §§ 53, 56, 460-61, 463-70.
9 See Morehouse v. Brooklyn Heights R.R., 185 N.Y. 520, 78 N.E. 179
(1906) ; Matter of Fitzsimons, 174 N.Y. 15, 66 N.E. 554 (1903).
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amount of time expended by the attorney and the character of the
claim.' 0
The legislature has not expressly given the Appellate Division
the power to regulate contingent fees," although in certain specific
cases (e.g., in actions instituted in behalf of an infant, 12 bastardy proceedings,'13 and estate proceedings 14) the courts are empowered by
statute to set fees. Section 474 of the judiciary Law states that fees
are to be determined by agreement between the parties. 15 The
Court of Appeals, commenting on this section, stated in Matter of
Fitzsimons:16
In view of the fact that by express statute [the predecessor of § 474] the
right is conferred upon an attorney or counselor to regulate the amount of his
compensation by agreement with his client, which is unrestrained and unlimited
by law, we cannot see how such an agreement can be interfered with and held
illegal until the question has been fully and fairly investigated and the facts
relating to the transaction plainly established by a trial. The statute conferred
upon the parties the right to make the contract, and conferred upon the court
no authority to make it for them.' 7
The Court in Gair v. Peck -1 likewise reasoned that the express statement by the legislature in Section 474 impliedly negated any judicial power of prior regulation of fees without express legislative

authorization.
However, legislative regulation of legal fees involves a constitutional question. The constitutionality of price regulation by state 19
and federal 20 legislatures has been upheld as a valid exercise of the
police power. These regulatory enactments, though in derogation of
freedom of contract, may be sustained if they bear a substantial relation to public health, safety, welfare or morals. 21 For example,
the prices of rent, 2 milk,23 lumber 24 and25 other commodities have
been regulated on the federal or state levels.
Morehouse v. Brooklyn Heights R.R., note 9 supra.
11 See Gair v. Peck, 139 N.Y.L.J. No. 64, p. 1, col. 1 (App. Div. 3d Dep't
March 27, 1958) (per curiam).
12 N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 474.
23 N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 120.
14 N.Y. SuRR. CT. Act § 231-a.
IS N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 474.
16 174 N.Y. 15, 66 N.E. 554 (1903).
17 Id. at 23, 66 N.E. at 562.
Is 139 N.Y.L.J. No. 64, p. 1, col. 1 (App. Div. 3d Dep't March 27, 1958)
(per curiam).
29 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1933).
20 Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495 (1922).
21 See Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1942); Nebbia v. New York,
note22 19 supra.
Bowles v. Willingham, note 21 supra.
23
Nebbia v. New York, note 19 supra.
24 Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U.S. 157 (1912).
25 See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 522 n.6 (1933).
10
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Legislatures have also regulated legal fees, notably in the workmen's compensation area. This power to set fees in specific compensation cases has been delegated to workmen's compensation commissions.2 Apparently, the requirement of substantial relation to public
welfare is satisfied if the purpose of the regulation is to protect
claimants from the practices of unscrupulous attorneys and to remove
the occasion for these practices.27 As was said in Calhoun z.
Massie: 28
By the enactment . . . of laws . .. placing limitations upon the fees properly
chargeable for services, Congress has sought both to prevent the stirring up
of unjust claims . . . and to reduce the temptation to adopt improper methods
of prosecution
which contracts for large fees, contingent upon success, . . .
29
encourage.

It would then appear that any regulation of amounts of contingent fees can be effected only through legislation. Such legislation,
if a proper exercise of the state's police power, would not violate
constitutional requirements. The only question remaining is whether
such regulation is desirable.

BANKS AND BANKING - DISCOUNTING OF LOANS SECURED BY
CHATTEL MORTGAGES HELD NOT IN VIOLATION OF BANKING LAW
SECTION 131 AND GENERAL CORPORATION LAW SECTION 18.-

Defendant, a non-banking corporation, loaned plaintiff-corporation
$129,500 and received in return promissory notes totaling $200,000
in value and a chattel mortgage on plaintiff's furniture and fixtures.
Plaintiff seeks a judgment declaring the notes and mortgage void
under Section 131 of the New York Banking Law and Section 18 of
the New York General Corporation Law which prohibit the discounting of loans by non-banking corporations. In granting a motion by
the defendant for summary judgment the New York Supreme Court
held that the discounting of loans secured by chattel mortgages is not
26 See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE ANN. § 4906 (West 1955), which provides that
the Industrial Accident Commission may determine reasonable legal fees; in
Arizona, ARIZ. Rav. STAT. § 23-1069 (1955) provides that the Industrial Commission, upon application, may make provision for an attorney's fee; in Florida,
the Industrial Commission may provide for an attorney's fee, according to
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.34 (1951).
27 See Calhoun v. Massie, 253 U.S. 170 (1920).
See also the broad dictum
in Yeiser v. Dysart, 267 U.S. 540, 541 (1924), indicating that, since the practice of law is a privilege granted by the state, the legislature may impose any
reasonable conditions upon such practice for the public good.
28253 U.S. 170 (1920).
29 Id. at 174.

